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FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 2.0: THE EVER-EXPANDING
DEFINITION OF NEUTRALITY UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
W. Mike Jayne*
ABSTRACT
Since the early days of dial-up service, prominent voices
have urged government regulation of speech on the Internet. A
cross-section of policymakers and pundits are now calling for a
change in the status quo, while others warn that recent
developments could spur a departure from the “hands-off”
policy of the FCC.
During the net neutrality debates, many critics feared
that the Open Internet Order would lead to greater FCC control
of the Internet, with some even going further: warning that the
agency would implement some form of a new Fairness
Doctrine for the medium. Despite the Restoring Internet
Freedom’s essential repeal of the Open Internet Order, these
concerns have been given credence by calls for crackdowns on
fake news and extremism; for platform, search, and app
neutrality; and for government intervention to stop the
censorship policies of Silicon Valley companies.
This Article begins by surveying several developments
that give rise to this alarmism. It examines whether the FCC
would have the statutory authority to regulate content on the
Internet. It then considers several policy proposals before
assessing the constitutionality of any regulatory intervention. It
argues that greater regulation of online political content will
chill free speech, spawn unintended consequences, and run
afoul of the Constitution. It argues that an attempt to enforce
any type of Fairness Doctrine for the Internet will be too
difficult to administer, leading to suffocating litigation; unfair
application to ISPs, platforms, and websites; and an
intellectually diminished Internet.

*

Esq., Assistant Director of Regulatory Outreach, Mercatus Center at George
Mason University. The author wrote this article independently of his employment
with the Mercatus Center. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do
not reflect official positions of the Mercatus Center or George Mason University.
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INTRODUCTION

Bloggers beware: according to former Federal Election
Commission (FEC) Chairman Lee Goodman, Americans are
one vote away from a “Chinese censorship board,” in which
you could be fined for posting about politics during election
seasons.1 Goodman’s warning followed an FEC decision that
narrowly staved off setting precedent for new rules requiring
citizen bloggers to register with the government and provide
financial records.2 After review of a complaint in October 2014,
the six members of the FEC deadlocked three-three along
partisan lines, resulting in dismissal of a case,3 but igniting
debate about limits to the FEC’s regulation of Internet political
speech. Under the current rule, issued in 2006, the FEC can
regulate only two categories of online political commentary:
campaign content and paid advertising.4 The FEC has purview
over candidates, parties, and political action committees
(PACs) in other media,5 so the rule’s rationale is that
campaigns should not be able to avoid restrictions and
requirements simply by moving the same content online.
Similarly, campaign finance laws apply to television and radio
advertising, and the rule extends that authority to the Internet
as well.6
At issue before the commission were two videos created
by a nonprofit and posted to YouTube during the 2014
congressional midterm season.7 Because the organization was
not a campaign entity subject to existing FEC regulation and
did not pay for the videos or their placement, the FEC’s three
Republican members reasoned that the nonprofit was not
subject to any restrictions or reporting requirements under
1

Stephen Dinan, FEC Democrat Pushes for Controls on Internet Political Speech, WASH.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/24/fecdemocrat-pushes-controls-internet-political-sp/?page=all.
2
Id.
3
Checks and Balances for Economic Growth, MUR 6729 (FEC Oct. 24, 2014)
(statement of Chairman Lee E. Goodman et al.),
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363864.pdf (“Consistent with [the Office of
General Counsel]’s recommendation, we voted to find no reason to believe a
violation occurred and the matter was closed.”).
4
Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589 (Apr. 12, 2006) (to be codified at 11
C.F.R. pt. 100, 110, 114).
5
The FEC and the Federal Campaign Finance Law, FED. ELEC. COMM’N (Feb. 2004),
https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/fecfeca.shtml#Campaign_Finance_Law
(last updated Feb. 2017) (“The FECA requires candidate committees, party
committees and PACs to file periodic reports disclosing the money they raise and
spend.”).
6
Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,589.
7
Checks and Balances for Economic Growth, MUR 6729 (FEC Oct. 24, 2014)
(statement of Chairman Lee E. Goodman et al.),
http://eqs.fec.gov/eqsdocsMUR/14044363864.pdf.
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current rules.8 Four members must vote to hear a case, 9 so the
deadlock precluded a formal ruling on the matter. But thenFEC Vice Chair Ann Ravel vowed that the Commission would
revisit the issue in 2015 to consider changing the current rule10
that leaves the Internet largely unregulated as a unique medium
of “low cost” and “widespread accessibility.”11 Ravel and likeminded advocates argue that the 2006 rule fails to foresee how
the Internet is evolving, and how sophisticated PACs,
campaigns, and political operatives can skirt campaign finance
laws governing traditional political advertising by publishing
comparable, if not identical, material online.12
On February 11, 2015, the FEC held hearings on
campaign finance regulation, including new rules for Internet
political speech, receiving more than 32,000 comments in
response to its public notice.13 Less than two weeks later,
Commissioner Lee Goodman and Ajit Pai of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) countered with a joint
column criticizing the plan.14 They argue greater regulation of
online political content will unfairly target citizen groups,
bloggers, and social media users by imposing onerous
registration and reporting requirements that will ultimately curb
free speech.15 Even if the FEC does not amend the 2006 rule, it
argues that the current ad-hoc, case-by-case approach to
adjudicating Internet political content—determined largely by
the make-up of the commission at the time of any given
ruling—will discourage many from posting or publishing online
political content, resulting in a chilling of speech.16
FCC Chairman Pai has also criticized prior initiatives by
his own agency, such as the “Multi-Market Study of Critical
Information Needs," which would have sent FCC agents to
8

Id.
About the FEC, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://classic.fec.gov/about.shtml (last
visited May 3, 2018).
10
See Statement of Vice Chair Ann M. Ravel Encouraging Public Comments to
Increase Disclosure and Address Corruption in the Political Process, Oct. 20, 2014,
available at https://www.fec.gov/resources/aboutfec/commissioners/ravel/statements/141020_Ravel_Statement_on_McCutcheon.pd
f [hereinafter Statement of Vice Chair Ann M. Ravel Encouraging Public
Comments].
11
Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. at 18,589.
12
See Statement of Vice Chair Anne M. Ravel Encouraging Public Comments, supra
note 10.
13
Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Public Hearing on the McCutcheon v.
FEC Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, February 11, 2015 (Feb. 10, 2015),
https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-public-hearing-on-the/.
14
Ajit Pai & Lee Goodman, Internet Freedom Works, POLITICO: MAG. (Feb. 23, 2015),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/fcc-internet-regulations-ajitpai-115399.
15
Id.
16
Id.
9
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question reporters, editors, and broadcast station chiefs about
their news practices, an effort he argued was a step toward
reinstituting the now-defunct “Fairness Doctrine” of policing
political news content.17 The FCC backed away from the study
in response to controversy.18 Corydon B. Dunham, NBC’s
former executive legal counsel of twenty-five years,19 warns that
the FCC seeks to control TV and radio news through a
revamped “Localism, Balance and Diversity Doctrine” that
would establish regulations and appoint boards to monitor
broadcast stations’ exercise of news judgment.20 Given that the
FCC is currently auctioning off much of the broadcast spectrum
to wireless broadband providers to expand and improve
smartphone service,21 Dunham fears that narrowing the already
scarce range of broadcast frequencies will intensify competition
for the dwindling number of TV station licenses.22 Because TV
stations must apply to the FCC for licenses to operate, he
argues that this increased competition will give the FCC greater
leverage over station managers, who in turn may worry that
their editorial judgments could affect the likelihood that the
FCC will renew their licenses.23 This may dampen stations’
enthusiasm for covering certain issues, shaping the content of
not only what they broadcast, but what they share online.
While the FEC and FCC have independent statutory
authority, they are both means by which government can
regulate public debate, an objective of many academics,
politicians, and policymakers who are frustrated by both the
Citizens United v. FEC24 decision striking restrictions on
campaign spending25 and the current state of mass media.
Traditionally, many proponents of greater government control
online have been liberals or Democrats, but recent allegations

17

Ajit Pai, The FCC Wades Into the Newsroom, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2014, 7:26 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230468090457936690382826
0732?cb=logged0.4133963421443206.
18
Julian Hattem, FCC Pulls Plug on Press Study, THE HILL (Feb. 21, 2014, 4:03 PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/198943-fcc-kills-contested-press-study.
19
Ginny Grimsley, Former NBC Legal Exec Cory Dunham Warns of New Threats to Free
Speech, MARKETWIRED (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:34 PM),
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/former-nbc-legal-exec-cory-dunhamwarns-of-new-threat-to-free-speech-1630259.htm.
20
CORYDON B. DUNHAM, GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF NEWS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE 3 (2011).
21
Matt Hamblen, FAQ: The FCC’s Upcoming Broadcast-TV Spectrum Auction,
COMPUTER WORLD (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:09 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2994217/mobile-wireless/faq-the-fcc-supcoming-broadcast-tv-spectrum-auction.html.
22
DUNHAM, supra note 20, at 2.
23
Id.
24
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
25
Id. at 372.
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of censorship by tech giants such as Google26 (whose parent
company Alphabet was the second largest donor to the 2016
Clinton campaign27), YouTube (a subsidiary of Google),28
Facebook,29 and Twitter,30 have elicited calls by some
conservatives and Republicans for government to referee the
Net.31
Lawmakers are increasingly zeroing in on Silicon
Valley, and several of them head relevant committees of
jurisdiction. Commerce Committee chairman Senator John
Thune, R-S.D., sent a letter to Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerburg, demanding the company disclose how it generates
its news feeds.32 Twitter banned Rep. Marsha Blackburn (RTenn.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and
Technology, from posting a Senate campaign ad that its
curators deemed too inflammatory for its criticisms of Planned
Parenthood.33 The following day, Twitter reversed course, but
not before Blackburn pounced on the incident as a fundraising
opportunity.34 Prior to announcing his intention to resign, thenSenator Al Franken, D-Minn., ranking member of the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law,
called for expanding net neutrality to cover content generated

26

Blake Neff, Video: Is Google Manipulating Searches to be Pro-Hillary?, DAILY CALLER
(June 9, 2016, 6:55 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2016/06/09/video-is-googlemanipulating-searches-to-be-pro-hillary/.
27
Top Contributors, Federal, Election Data for Hillary Clinton, 2016 Cycle, CTR. FOR
RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/contributors?cycle=2016&id=n00000019&src
=c&type=f (last visited May 3, 2018).
28
See Ian Birnbaum, YouTube is Leaving Its Creators in the Dark, OUTLINE (Sept. 18,
2017, 9:23 AM), https://theoutline.com/post/2258/youtube-is-leaving-its-creatorsin-the-dark.
29
See Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative
News, GIZMODO (May 9, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://gizmodo.com/former-facebookworkers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006.
30
See Cathy Young, How Facebook, Twitter Silence Conservative Voices Online, THE HILL
(Oct. 28, 2016, 12:55 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/media/303295how-facebook-twitter-are-systematically-silencing-conservative.
31
See Jeremy Carl, How to Break Silicon Valley’s Anti-Free-Speech Monopoly, NAT’L
REV., (Aug. 15, 2017, 8:00 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/450476/silicon-valleys-anti-conservativebias-solution-treat-major-tech-companies-utilities.
32
Nick Corasaniti & Mike Isaac, Senator Demands Answers From Facebook on Claims of
‘Trending’ List Bias, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/technology/facebook-thuneconservative.html.
33
Kevin Robillard, Twitter Pulls Blackburn Senate Ad Deemed ‘Inflammatory,’ POLITICO
(Oct. 9, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/09/marshablackburn-twitter-ad-243607.
34
Jessie Hellmann, Twitter Backs Down, Will Allow Blackburn to Promote Senate Ad, The
Hill (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/354873twitter-will-allow-blackburn-to-promote-senate-ad-after-controversy.
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by Facebook, Google, and Amazon.35 While he has not
endorsed the proposal, Chairman Pai shared the underlying
sentiment that “[l]arge Silicon Valley platforms today pose a far
greater threat to a free and open internet[,] than do internet
service providers.”36
Meanwhile, Democratic lawmakers are urging the FEC
to develop new rules for political advertising on social media
after Facebook disclosed that Russians were purchasing ads on
its platform to influence the 2016 presidential election.37 These
tech companies are already facing pressure from European
lawmakers to combat terrorism, extremism, “hate speech,” and
fake news by aggressively curating their users’ content.38 After
months of opposition, Facebook and Google granted support to
a Senate bill that would subject online entities to liability for
facilitating sex trafficking on their websites,39 and President
Trump recently signed its House counterpart into law.40 The
bill, titled Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act (FOSTA), makes an exception to Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act.41 Section 230 allows
websites to post third party content without being responsible
for it,42 and it has been instrumental in fostering innovation and
protecting free speech online.43 Critics argue this exception,
even for a worthy cause, is a slippery slope that could lead to

35

Al Franken, We Must Not Let Big Tech Threaten Our Security, Freedoms and
Democracy, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017, 2:20 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/08/big-tech-securityfreedoms-democracy-al-franken.
36
Ajit Pai, Restoring a Light Touch to Internet Regulations, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/5/restoring-a-light-touch-tofcc-internet-regulation/.
37
See Kate Conger, Congress Wants New Rules for Online Political Advertising After
Russian Facebook Ads, GIZMODO (Sept. 20, 2017, 3:00 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/congress-wants-new-rules-for-online-political-advertisi1818591930.
38
See Danica Kirka, U.S. Tech May Find Their Future Shaped by Europe, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 17, 2017, 10:00 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/technology/sns-bc-eu--europe-controllingthe-internet-20171017-story.html.
39
See Cecilia King, In Reversal, Tech Companies Back Sex Trafficking Bill, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/technology/sex-traffickingbill.html.
40
Tom Jackman, Trump Signs ‘FOSTA’ Bill Targeting Online Sex Trafficking, Enables
States and Victims to Pursue Websites, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/11/trump-signsfosta-bill-targeting-online-sex-trafficking-enables-states-and-victims-to-pursuewebsites/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bd9607155f2f.
41
See H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017).
42
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
43
See Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited May 3, 2018).
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greater online censorship in the future.44 Considered alongside
these developments, the 2016 election may eventually be
regarded as a watershed in terms of the Internet’s place in
American public affairs.
Proponents of greater government control might see
their best chance for reshaping the channels of mass
communication dependent on a Democratic president in the
White House.45 Naturally, the election and re-election of
President Obama worried opponents that agencies would seek
to do just that.46 For example, the appointment of regulatory
enthusiast Cass Sunstein, who has previously called for
government regulation of online political content,47 as
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs stoked ongoing worry that the Obama Administration
was poised to exert greater control of the Web.48 President
Trump caused consternation while a candidate when he floated
the idea of “closing up” the Internet to combat terrorism.49
Though regulation of online political commentary and rules
governing Internet campaigning failed to achieve salience in the
2016 presidential election, candidate Donald Trump’s upset
had consequences. Commissioner Pai was President Trump’s
pick for Chairman and, as discussed below, the FCC has

44

See Elliot Harmon, Internet Censorship Bill Would Spell Disaster for Speech and
Innovation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/08/internet-censorship-bill-would-spelldisaster-speech-and-innovation.
45
See, e.g., Berin Szoka, How Net-Neutrality Advocates Would Let Trump Control the
Internet, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-net-neutrality-advocates-wouldlet-trump-control-the-internet/2017/07/19/52998b58-6bc2-11e7-9c15177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.fc468fd12921 (discussing the roles that
democratic Presidents Clinton and Obama played in relation to internet regulation:
“Democrats should have worked out a legislative deal while they held the White
House. It’s not too late, but it soon might be.”); Mario Trujillo, How Obama Helped
Reshape Internet Rules, THE HILL (June 6, 2016, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/283681-how-obama-helped-reshape-internetrules.
46
See Lachlan Markay, Dem Regulators Again Target Protections for Online Political
Speech, WASH. FREE BEACON (Aug. 10, 2016, 3:00 PM),
http://freebeacon.com/issues/dem-regulators-target-protections-online-politicalspeech/.
47
See Cass Sunstein, The Future of Free Speech, LITTLE MAG.,
http://www.littlemag.com/mar-apr01/cass.html (last visited May 3, 2018).
48
See Rudy Takala, Federal Election Commission to Consider Regulating Online Political
Speech, CNS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:15 AM),
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/rudy-takala/federal-election-commissionconsider-regulating-online-political-speech.
49
John Markoff, Why Donald Trump’s Call to ‘Close Up’ the Internet is Science Fiction,
N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Dec. 8, 2015, 5:06 PM),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/why-donald-trumps-call-to-close-upthe-internet-is-science-fiction/?_r=0&mtrref=undefined.
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embarked on a new direction.50 Two vacant seats on the FEC
to be filled by President Trump appointees portend policy
ramifications for that agency as well.51
Until recently, attention was fixed on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s pending decision on whether to grant certiorari to
review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s 2016
decision upholding the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order,
commonly known as net neutrality.52 Given the order’s effective
repeal by the Commission’s recent promulgation of the
Restoring Internet Freedom Order,53 the case will likely be
deemed moot. But there is nothing stopping a future
administration from reinstating net neutrality.54 And while most
of the net neutrality debate is focused on the rule’s technical
and economic issues, voices ranging from former FCC
Commissioner Robert McDowell55 to constitutional luminary
Lawrence Tribe56 have alleged that net neutrality runs afoul of
the First Amendment for at least two reasons: first, broadband
Internet service providers (ISPs) are speakers for First
Amendment purposes, and second, net neutrality invites
government into decisions about speech.57 Tribe contends that
the First Amendment prohibits government not just from
censoring speech, but from forcing private groups to carry or
transmit speech.58 Tribe maintains that net neutrality is based
on a mistaken premise that government is empowered to
referee private speech, but the First Amendment’s purpose is
not to ensure audiences equal access to all speakers, and the

50

Cecilia Kang, Ajit Pai, F.C.C. Chairman, Moves to Roll Back Telecom Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (April 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/technology/ajitpai-fcc-telecom-deregulation.html.
51
See Trevor Potter, With 2018 Midterms Approaching, Our Elections are Not Protected,
THE HILL (Mar. 6 2018, 7:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/376816with-2018-midterms-approaching-our-elections-are-not-protected.
52
See Giuseppe Macri, Net Neutrality Lawsuit Heads to the Supreme Court, GOV’T TECH.
(May 2, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/policy/Net-Neutrality-Lawsuit-Heads-tothe-Supreme-Court.html.
53
In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Rcd. 4434 (2017).
54
See Reinhardt Krause, Why FCC Net-Neutrality Reversal Could Later Be Reversed
Again, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY (Nov. 22, 2017),
https://www.investors.com/news/technology/why-fcc-net-neutrality-reversalcould-later-be-reversed-again/.
55
See Robert M. McDowell, Net Neutrality v. Free Speech, HUDSON INST. (Aug. 28,
2014), https://www.hudson.org/research/10575-net-neutrality-vs-free-speech.
56
See generally Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein, Proposed “Net
Neutrality” Mandates Could Be Counterproductive and Violate the First
Amendment, Exhibit A to Comments of Time Warner Cable, Inc., GN Docket No.
09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52 (FCC), Oct. 19, 2009, available at
http://freestatefoundation.org/images/TWC_Net_Neutrality_Violates_the_First_A
mendment_-Tribe_Goldstein.pdf.
57
Id. at 2.
58
Id.
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government is not free to second-guess ISPs regarding control
of their networks.59
Yet the First Amendment debate is far from an
academic one, as a casual Internet search will reveal. There is a
substantial body of alarmist commentary that net neutrality
and/or pressure from lawmakers could open the door for the
FCC to regulate online political content just as it did for
political content on radio and television under the Fairness
Doctrine. This is because much of the rationale for the FCC’s
regulation of the broadcast spectrum (radio and TV) is that the
medium is a public good, a justification that could plausibly be
extended to the Internet.60 As mentioned, the FCC is currently
auctioning off much of the broadcast spectrum to wireless
broadband providers.61 Transferring the FCC-controlled
broadcast spectrum to the wireless broadband network of the
Internet could invite the FCC to regulate the latter as part of its
turf.62 As discussed below, some critics fear the FCC will train
its regulatory crosshairs not just on ISPs, companies that
provide access to the Internet, but on so called “edge
providers,” entities that provide content and services to users
once they are connected to the Net.63 What then-Senator
Franken called for64 is already being rolled out in Europe.65
While net neutrality was about limiting the behavior of ISPs,
the concept of platform neutrality encompasses restrictions on
software systems.66 As platform neutrality proponent Professor
Frank Pasquale describes it, “[t]he core idea of neutrality is to
prevent massive intermediaries from distorting either private
59

Id.
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell, Remarks at the Media Institute Dinner (Jan.
28, 2009) (transcript available at
https://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/docs/20090129_162426_fairness_doctrine.pdf)
[hereinafter McDowell, Remarks at the Media Institute].
61
Matt Hamblen, FAQ: The FCC’s Upcoming Broadcast-TV Spectrum Auction,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:09 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2994217/mobile-wireless/faq-the-fcc-supcoming-broadcast-tv-spectrum-auction.html.
62
Corydon B. Dunham, We Must Demand Congress Kill Pending Censorship Proposal,
HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012, 9:53 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/corydon-b-dunham/we-must-demand-congressk_b_2164804.html.
63
Anna-Maria Kovacs, Regulatory Uncertainty: The FCC’s Open-Internet Docket, in
ECON. POL’Y VIGNETTE (Georgetown Ctr. for Bus. & Pub. Policy ed., 2015),
http://cbpp.georgetown.edu/sites/cbpp.georgetown.edu/files/Kovacs-regulatoruncertainty-FCCs-open-internet-docket.pdf.
64
Franken, supra note 35.
65
See, e.g., Kirka, supra note 38; Anya Schiffrin, How Europe Fights Fake News,
COLUM. J. REV. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/watchdog/europe-fights-fakenews-facebook-twitter-google.php.
66
See Roslyn Layton, Net Neutrality Will be Reincarnated as Platform Regulation, AEI:
AEIDEAS (Dec. 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.aei.org/publication/netneutrality-will-be-reincarnated-as-platform-regulation/.
60

2018]

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 2.0

476

commerce or the public sphere simply by virtue of their size,
network power or surveillance capacities”67 (emphasis added).
The terms “search neutrality” and “app neutrality” have
already entered the lexicon.68
If the FCC moves to regulate political speech, whether
on an “open Internet” or otherwise, then its best-known
blueprint would be its so-called Fairness Doctrine, the agency’s
near-forty-year policy of regulating the political speech of TV
and radio stations.69 The Fairness Doctrine (discussed in more
detail below) required broadcast license holders to devote
airtime to controversial issues of public importance and to
present opposing viewpoints on these issues.70 While the
Fairness Doctrine was abandoned in 1987 and officially wiped
from the Code of Federal Regulations in 2011, its resurrection
is routinely debated.71 While proponents of the Fairness
Doctrine have failed to reinstitute it in its traditional form, net
neutrality has stoked fresh fears that the Doctrine could be
applied to the Internet.72 As former FCC Commissioner Robert
McDowell remarks: “That’s just Marketing 101: if your brand
is controversial, make a new brand.73 The Doctrine could be
intertwined into other communication policy initiatives that are
more certain to move through the system, such as localism,
diversity or net neutrality.”74
This Article argues that the FEC and FCC should not
move to promulgate rules governing political content on the
Internet, because they would be counterproductive and
contrary to inviolable First Amendment values, faring no better
in promoting robust debate than the Fairness Doctrine did for
television or radio. It concludes that the practical and technical
challenges of enforcing political content rules would be more
trouble than they are worth. Finally, because the Supreme
Court has yet to define the permissible scope of government
67
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regulation of the medium, this Article culls together the Court’s
principal rulings on communications law to predict that it
would likely strike down FEC and FCC rules that required ISPs
and websites to provide certain political content, whether those
rules were in the form of a reprised Fairness Doctrine or that of
a different regime altogether.
In order to place this debate in its proper context, a brief
overview of the FCC’s role in regulating broadcast media under
its Fairness Doctrine policy is in order.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Fairness Doctrine’s Troubled History Demonstrates the
Unintended Consequences of Regulating Communications
Technology’s Political Content
Former Commissioner McDowell and Chairman Pai
have invoked the Fairness Doctrine in debates over the FCC’s
role in regulating the Internet because many of the arguments
both for and against greater government policing of online
political content were often made in the public quarrel over the
agency’s best-known foray into content regulation.75
The Fairness Doctrine was a policy of the FCC during
the second half of the 20th Century.76 It was intended to serve
the public interest in having robust coverage and debate of
public affairs on radio and television.77 While the goal of this
policy was at least initially laudable, controversy later arose as
to whether the policy was at best ineffective, or worse, had the
opposite effect of diminishing public affairs coverage.78
Understanding the Fairness Doctrine is crucial to
understanding how political content regulations could impact
users’ online experiences.
There is a limited range of frequencies within the
electromagnetic spectrum for transmitting broadcast (TV and
radio) communications.79 The FCC’s predecessor, the Federal
Radio Commission, was formed to regulate the “free-for-all”
caused by too many broadcasters fighting over available
frequencies, a situation akin to several people shouting into the
75
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same microphone.80 The Communications Act of 193481 created
the FCC and charged the agency with regulating radio,82 along
with cable,83 telegraph,84 and telephone systems.85 The
Congressional solution to managing access to radio was to have
the Commission grant stations exclusive licenses for specific
frequencies, necessarily excluding other speakers from using the
“public good” of the airwaves to voice their messages86 and
birthing the concept of spectrum scarcity.87 Beginning in 1929,
the Commission agreed to hear complaints from those denied
by stations an opportunity to express their views.88 This
acknowledgement of citizens’ standing was the underpinning of
the idea that, because airwaves are a public good, those granted
licenses had a duty to use their stations in the public interest
and should be regulated to ensure they do so.89 This policy
evolved through case law until 1949,90 when an FCC report—
drawing on statutory authorization from Section 326 of the
Communications Act of 1934 and its legislative history—
established the Fairness Doctrine’s two parts. First,
broadcasters were required to air issues that were “so critical or
of such great public importance that it would be unreasonable
for a licensee to ignore them completely.”91 Second,
broadcasters had an “affirmative duty” to provide an
opportunity for dueling positions on these issues.92 This duty
arose from the right of the public to have access to information
“rather than any right on the part of the Government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to
broadcast his own particular views on any matter,” as it is the
80
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“foundation stone of the American system of broadcasting.”93
This report is generally regarded as the moment when the
Doctrine took effect, lasting nearly four decades until it was
abandoned in 1987.94
The Supreme Court upheld the doctrine most famously
in the 1969 Red Lion decision,95 finding lawful an FCC order to
a radio station to provide a journalist who was attacked by a
clergyman/commentator during the station’s program an
opportunity to respond on air.96 The Court based its decision on
the scarcity principle, holding that because broadcast stations
are limited in number by the electromagnetic spectrum, the
government had the right to regulate them in the public
interest.97 It added an additional reason a few years later:
television and radio users constitute a “captive audience,” in
that unlike newspaper readers who can actively flip through
material and ignore articles and advertisements, broadcast
audiences are subject to whatever content is transmitted over
the finite number of stations at any given time and therefore
have less choice.98 But the Court stated that constitutional
questions would need to be revisited if the Doctrine ever proved
to reduce diversity of opinion by stymieing speech rather than
promoting a wide range of viewpoints.99
In 1985, the FCC issued a report following a study of the
Fairness Doctrine’s effects on broadcasters.100 The report found
that the rule had a chilling effect on free speech by making
broadcasters wary of airing views on many topics, and that it
often inadvertently favored corporate interests at the expense of
less-financed and less-organized citizen coalitions.101
The FCC voted to abolish the Fairness Doctrine in 1987
for three main reasons: it allowed government to question the
news judgments of broadcasters, threatening the First
Amendment bulwark of a free press; it chilled speech, as
broadcasters avoided airing controversial issues that would
invite complaints; and finally, emerging technology (think cable
93
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television) rendered the “scarcity” rationale of the court
moot.102 The agency formally erased the policy from the Code
of Federal Regulations in 2011.103 Yet in the interim, the issue
was far from settled, a perennial flashpoint. Congress drafted
legislation to statutorily reinstate the Doctrine at least three
times during four presidential administrations following its
demise, most recently within the Media Ownership Reform Act
of 2005.104 In 2007, after several Democratic senators called for
reinstatement of the Doctrine in an effort to curb the influence
of conservative talk radio, the House of Representatives voted
309-115 to bar the FCC from bringing it back.105 But except for
President Clinton, who lost control of Congress in 1994, and
with it any hope of legislating the Fairness Doctrine, every chief
executive from President Reagan to President Obama has
publicly opposed it. Though he has remained mostly silent on
the controversy, a recent pair of tweets106 from President Trump
prompted some to speculate that he was calling for its return.107
During the campaign, candidate Trump seemed to disparage
the Doctrine in linking it to net neutrality,108 a point of view
discussed below.
The Fairness Doctrine remains a perennial issue. While
prominent policymakers no longer call for it by name, many
fear the objectives of the Doctrine are being pursued through
other policies, such as localism. Localism involves a system of
community advisory boards that monitor broadcast stations’
content and advise the FCC on whether to renew the stations’
102
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licenses, potentially compromising the stations’ independence
by pressuring them to please advisory board members. ThenCommissioner Pai was not alone in expressing concern that the
FCC’s Critical Information Needs study was a move toward a
renewed Fairness Doctrine.109 In December 2013, sixteen
Republican members of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce sent then-FCC Chairman Wheeler a letter blasting
the study as a “Fairness Doctrine 2.0.”110 Others allege that
Fairness Doctrine proponents, smarting from recent legislative
defeats, have backed off broadcast to pursue broadband.111
Commentators have regarded net neutrality with suspicion,
questioning whether the FCC’s then-new policy could pave the
way for future rules governing online political content.112
Senator Ted Cruz of Texas has called net neutrality
“Obamacare for the Internet.”113 But is it a Fairness Doctrine
for the Internet? The idea that net neutrality would be a means
toward regulating online political speech has been met with
widespread ridicule.
B. The Net Neutrality Debate Is Not Going Away, And Its
Implications for Shaping Content Should Not Be Ignored
Most commentary concerning net neutrality deals with
how ISPs transmit content, whether Title II, which is discussed
below, is the proper framework for regulation, and the
economics of net neutrality applied to producers and consumers
of Internet service. But there has been a First Amendment
aspect to the debate, and its ramifications for how net neutrality
could influence online content should not be overlooked.
While the FCC has reversed course on net neutrality by
effectively repealing the Open Internet Order, the latter remains
important for at least two reasons. First, there is nothing to stop
the FCC under a future administration from reprising net
neutrality as official U.S. policy, and it is doubtful that its
supporters will drop the issue any time soon. Democratic
Senators recently introduced a resolution of disapproval under
109
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the Congressional Review Act to override the Restoring
Internet Freedom order.114 Though one vote shy of the required
51 needed in the Senate and bereft of any chance it will pass the
House or be signed by President Trump, the gesture sets up an
election issue many Democrats see as a winning one.115 State
attorneys general have announced lawsuits against the new
order,116 while state lawmakers have introduced net neutrality
legislation.117 Second, if net neutrality were to make a
comeback, it could arrive in something very similar to the Open
Internet Order. The latter was a product of trial and error, the
FCC’s third attempt after losing twice to court challenges. Net
neutrality could also open the door to, or be a step toward,
platform, app, search and/or content neutrality.
If the substance of the Open Internet Order were to be
reinstated by a future administration, the FCC would be the
new referee of the Internet. While that may not affect users’
online experiences in the short term, it could have
consequences for the Internet in the future.118 Net neutrality, a
term coined by Tim Wu, a Columbia Law professor and
advocate for greater government control of online political
content, refers to the principle that ISPs must transmit all online
content in a ‘neutral’ fashion.119 This means that ISPs cannot
block content from reaching their users, cannot speed up or
slow down content, or enter into “paid prioritization”
arrangements with content providers to give them preferential
treatment. Net neutrality supporters believe these rules will best
protect users from potential abuses by ISPs.120 They seem to
fear ISPs’ control over the Internet more than control by
government.121 Net neutrality critics, by contrast, fear
government intrusion into the Internet more than unfettered
ISPs. They argue that FCC control of the Net will drive up
114
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costs, stifle innovation, and perhaps compromise Internet
speeds.122 Most of the public debate over net neutrality has been
about its effects on the cost and quality of Internet service, and
whether the free market or government regulation is better able
to maximize the Internet’s potential while protecting its
consumers. But Tribe and others have questioned the Order’s
accordance with the First Amendment rights of ISPs.123
The FCC attempted to promulgate net neutrality in a
binding rule in 2014, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit struck it down.124 The court held
that the FCC lacked jurisdiction over the Internet because the
medium was then classified under Title I of the
Communications Act of 1934 as an information service.125 In
March 2015, the FCC issued its Open Internet Order, which
attempted to resolve its lack of authority by reclassifying the
Internet as a telecommunications service covered under the
Act.126 This essentially put the Internet on par with telephone
networks and empowered the FCC to exert comparable
oversight. Because many telephone regulations would be illsuited if applied to the Web, the FCC exercised forbearance in
issuing the Order by exempting the Internet from many of the
Title II regulations applicable to telecommunications services,
and instead applying only fourteen sections from Title II—at
least at the time.127 In June 2016, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
new order.128 Recently, however, the FCC voted 3-2 in favor of
a proposed rule, “Restoring Internet Freedom,” that scraps the
Open Internet Order altogether, or at least until a future
administration reinstates it.129 Now published in final form, the
order awaits approval by the Office of Management and
Budget.130 Writing a day after Chairman Pai unveiled the
proposed rule, Tim Wu predicted a court would strike it down,
presumably because the rule lacked sufficient evidentiary
support for such a significant departure from the Open Internet
Order.131 In any case, these developments underscore an
122
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underlying reality: that absent a Supreme Court ruling, the net
neutrality debates will likely endure in perpetuity, perhaps as a
political struggle played out every time a new president is
elected.
In an era of media convergence, when TV, radio, print,
and cable content are consolidated on the single medium of the
Internet, it is at least plausible that Fairness Doctrine
proponents would abandon the unsuccessful strategy of
reimposing the rule on broadcast in order to pursue the much
more enticing prospect of regulating political content on the
Internet.132 Tech scholar Brent Skorup has drawn attention to
Wu’s own admission before Congress that Wu’s ideal role for
the FCC goes beyond that of a mere traffic cop monitoring
transmission speeds: net neutrality is needed so that the FCC
has the ability to shape “media policy, social policy, oversight
of the political process, [and] issues of free speech."133
Because the Open Internet Order granted the FCC
greater purview over ISPs by reclassifying them as common
carriers, it afforded the FCC the familiar rationale of regulating
a public utility (broadband access) for a public good. This good
may become even more “public” as government invests
taxpayer resources in developing the nation’s broadband
infrastructure to promote access,134 as well as by reallocating
broadcast frequencies for wireless broadband channels. As Rep.
Marsha Blackburn, R-Tenn., Chairman of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on
Communications and Technology, noted: “I've been very
concerned about net neutrality turning out to be the Fairness
Doctrine of the Internet, and having that applied to websites."135
She echoes observers’ concerns that European Union advisory
boards have called for a “Web fairness doctrine” requiring
websites from those of small blogs to big news organizations to
“set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by
substantial evidence”).
132
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post opposing viewpoints or face fines.136 That regulation of
ISPs, entities that provide Internet access, could lead to
regulation of “edge providers,” entities that provide online
content and services, is a prospect mulled by many experts who
see ISPs and edge providers as part of an inseparable virtuouscycle ecosystem.137 Because the line between what constitutes a
telecommunications service versus an information service is
blurry, the FCC could parse the nature of the services offered
by edge providers to eventually classify them as
telecommunications services subject to Title II regulation.138
The intentions of the 2015 order’s drafters and their decision to
exercise forbearance in applying other provisions of Title II
would not bar a future FCC from going further.139 In doing so,
they could affect the speech of edge providers. Former FCC
Chairman Tom Wheeler reflects the view of many that such
concerns are misplaced and that net neutrality would have little
effect on Internet political speech. "This is no more a plan to
regulate the Internet than the First Amendment is a plan to
regulate free speech."140
In any event, developments in Europe, calls for
regulation of online platforms, and protests of those suspended
or banned from online services promise to keep net neutrality,
platform neutrality, and their underlying First Amendment
implications front and center in the public debate.
C. Whether the FCC Could Hatch a Fairness Doctrine 2.0 Depends
on Both its Statutory and Constitutional Authority.
Judging whether critics of net neutrality are justified in
their concern for free speech requires determining first whether
the FCC could interpret its governing statutes as authorizing it
to regulate the substance of content in addition to how it is
transmitted, and whether it could regulate edge providers in
addition to ISPs. Though it has been superseded, one could
scour the 400-page Open Internet Order for express grounds to
establish a web-based Fairness Doctrine, or for a rationale that
could support a future content-based rule. If it does not, then
the next question is whether that Order’s reclassification of the
Internet from an information service to a telecommunications
service, by itself, empowers the FCC more broadly to create a
136
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Fairness
Doctrine
down
the
road.
Absent new
telecommunications legislation, a future FCC would need both
a statutory basis and an interpretation of that basis that passes
constitutional muster.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. The FCC Could Rely on a Reclassification of the Internet as a Title
II Telecommunications Service, along with Authority Derived from
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as a Blueprint
for Regulating the Content of Edge Providers in the Future.
In his statement dissenting from the 2015 Open Internet
Order, then-Commissioner Pai warned that the rule “gives the
FCC the power to micromanage virtually every aspect of how
the Internet works.”141 If the Restoring Internet Freedom order
is struck by a court or the Open Internet Order’s provisions are
reinstated by a future FCC, the Commission will need to pass
three tests before exercising any authority over edge providers
or the content of online speech: it must act pursuant to a valid
rule, properly derived from lawful statute, within the bounds of
the Constitution. At first glance, the 2015 Order does not
appear to govern edge providers or the substance of online
content. It referred specifically to ISPs in the “last-mile” of
Internet service, so it seemed to exclude edge providers from
the ambit of its express provisions.142 While ISPs theoretically
could, and often do, provide content at points of access (think
start-up pages), the Order did not appear to include explicit
expressive restrictions or requirements pertaining to ISPs. As
part of its reclassification, the Order applied fourteen Title II
sections to the Internet.143 But aside from proscribing “unjust
and unreasonable” practices144 in the context of speeding up,
slowing down, blocking, or entering into paid prioritization
agreements with content providers, there is nothing spelled out
in the Order that directly involves the FCC in regulating speech
or expression.
But if there was a Trojan horse in the Order, it was the
so-called “General Conduct Rule” which read as follows:
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Any person engaged in the provision of
broadband Internet access service, insofar as such
person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably
interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i)
end users’ ability to select, access, and use
broadband Internet access service or the lawful
Internet content, applications, services, or devices
of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’ ability to
make lawful content, applications, services, or
devices available to end users. Reasonable
network management shall not be considered a
violation of this rule.145
As possibly the most controversial provision of the
Order, the General Conduct Rule drew criticism from both
supporters and opponents of net neutrality.146 It purported to
supplement three bright-line rules (no blocking, throttling, or
paid prioritization) with a fourth and more flexible tool for
preventing ISPs from engaging in unforeseen conduct deemed
harmful to an “open” Internet.147 This rule was explained by
reference to a list of seven “non-exhaustive” factors: (1) enduser control; (2) competitive effects; (3) consumer protection;
(4) effects on innovation, investment, or broadband
deployment; (5) free expression; (6) application on an agnostic
basis (nondiscrimination against end-users); and (7) standard
practices.148 Each factor was described in a short paragraph.149
Given that one of seven factors was the impact on free
speech and expression, at least one commentator asserted that
the FCC could use the General Conduct Rule to decree
something very close to the Fairness Doctrine: finding websites
too one-sided as to threaten free speech by not providing
sufficient coverage to contrary views.150 Even among those who
did not go so far, critics complained that the rule created too
much uncertainty.151 They argued that ISPs would be dissuaded
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from innovation and investment;152 companies with deep
pockets153 and close ties to the Commission would have an
unfair advantage;154 consumers would not know when they had
a valid complaint;155 and the FCC would have a blank check to
ban practices it did not like.156 Even then-Chairman Wheeler
was unsure of the boundaries cabining the FCC’s new
authority. When asked at a press conference to outline the
General Conduct Rule’s parameters, he replied, “We don’t
really know. We don’t know where things go next.”157
The petitioners in United States Telecom challenged the
General Conduct Rule as unconstitutionally vague, but the
D.C. Circuit was not persuaded.158 It found the seven factors
and the paragraphs explaining them provided enough context
to satisfy due process concerns, writing “we can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language.”159
It is possible, though not entirely probable, that a future
FCC would rely on something very similar to the General
Conduct Rule to police edge providers. Consider the language
of the free expression factor:
Practices that threaten the use of the Internet as a
platform for free expression would likely
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably
disadvantage consumers' and edge providers'
ability to use BIAS to communicate with each
other, thereby causing harm to that ability.
Further, such practices would dampen consumer
demand for broadband services, disrupting the
virtuous cycle, and harming end user and edge
provider use of the Internet under the legal
standard we set forth today.160
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The sixth factor’s description also provides empowering
language for a more activist FCC:
Application-agnostic (sometimes referred to as
use-agnostic) practices likely do not cause an
unreasonable interference or an unreasonable
disadvantage to end users' or edge providers'
ability to use BIAS to communicate with each
other. Application-agnostic practices do not
interfere with end users' choices about which
content, applications, services, or devices to use,
nor do they distort competition and unreasonably
disadvantage certain edge providers. As such,
they likely would not cause harm by
unreasonably interfering with or disadvantaging
end users or edge providers' ability to
communicate using BIAS.161
While these provisions were crafted in the context of
regulating ISPs, the positions expressed are similar to France’s
Conseil National du Numérique’s rationale for implementing a
policy of platform neutrality, which is set off in bold type in the
commission’s report: "The goals behind the neutrality principle
should also be factored into the development of digital
platforms: while extremely useful and innovative, their growth
must not be allowed to hamper the use of Internet as a forum
for creation, free expression and the exchange of ideas."162
These factors suggest that online entities that prevent
Internet users from transmitting and receiving the content of
their choice could be in violation of the Order’s substance,
illustrating that other types of neutrality are not as far removed
as a cursory reading of the rule may indicate. The Order was
directed at companies who provide access to the Internet, so a
future FCC would likely need a more expansive rule to apply
these conduct standards to platforms and other edge providers.
But a reclassification under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934 essentially makes ISPs common
carriers that must act in the public interest. One prevailing
interpretation is that ISPs are like public utility companies
providing electricity.163 As such, they have been granted
161
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government permission to harness and provide the public good
of the Internet, and as a condition of such permission, they
must adhere to government rules of conduct.164
The common carrier interpretation carried the day with
the D.C. Circuit.165 It found the Commission’s reclassification
under Title II permissible and dismissed arguments that
broadband service was distinguishable from other forms of
common carriage.166 The court held that, like telephone and
telegraph networks, ISPs facilitate a neutral platform for speech
purposes.167 But it went on to acknowledge a hypothetical: ISPs
that went beyond providing access to the entire Internet to
instead offer less than “substantially all” websites would be
engaging in content curation, thereby exercising First
Amendment speech.168 Brent Skorup points out that this might
actually encourage ISPs to engage in censorship or content
discrimination in order to escape the ambit of what was in the
Open Internet Order.169 Under those circumstances, the
curating ISP would be cloaked with Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act,170 which Skorup notes is
inconsistent with the Title II rationale that ISPs are mere
conduits in the same way that telephone networks are.171 This
suggests that at a minimum, net neutrality has the potential to
shape content indirectly by encouraging ISPs to curate or
restrict content, a form of indirect censorship. Recall that this
was a criticism of the Fairness Doctrine—that stations would
refuse to publish some content altogether to avoid running
afoul of the FCC. Because profit-seeking companies will
respond to popular preferences and pressure, ISPs would likely
ban unpopular speech as part of any efforts at content curation.
But unpopular speech is precisely the sort of speech the First
Amendment was designed to protect.172
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 is not the
only possible statutory justification for this paradigm. During
the net neutrality debates, advocates differed over how the FCC
was to respond to the D.C. Circuit’s 2014 decision173 denying
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the agency’s second attempt at net neutrality.174 While most
proponents saw Title II as the way forward, then-Chairman
Wheeler favored two paragraphs from Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the appropriate source of
FCC authority.175 The Open Internet Order relied on both
statutes.176
Opponents of the rule argue the FCC could potentially
wield much of the power it held over broadcast stations against
ISPs by relying on Section 706.177 The section reads in pertinent
part that the FCC:
Shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications
capability to all Americans (including, in
particular, elementary and secondary schools and
classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent
with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,
price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance,
measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating
methods that remove barriers to infrastructure
investment.178
Such authority suggests, that at the very least, the FCC
may rely on the public interest rationale that undergirded the
Fairness Doctrine. Harold Feld, senior vice president of Public
Knowledge, a nonprofit that supports net neutrality, said the
FCC's authority could even extend to edge providers who use
the Internet to distribute their content.179 Judge Silberman of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit warned in the 2014
Verizon v. FCC decision that the FCC’s reclassification under
Section 706 “would virtually free the Commission from its
congressional tether” by giving it “virtually unlimited power to

174

Fran Berkman, Title II is the Key to Net Neutrality—So What is it? DAILY DOT (May
20, 2014, 7:04 AM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/what-is-title-ii-netneutrality-fcc/.
175
John Healey, FCC's Wheeler Tries New Sales Pitch for Net Neutrality Proposal, L.A.
TIMES ( May 12, 2014, 4:06 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/laol-net-neutrality-fcc-wheeler-backpeddle-20140512-story.html.
176
In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5603
(2015).
177
Marguerite Reardon, Worried about Net Neutrality? Maybe it's the FCC that Should
Really Concern You, CNET (Jan. 23, 2014, 4:00 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/worried-about-net-neutrality-maybe-its-the-fcc-thatshould-really-concern-you/.
178
Telecommunications Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706(a), 110 Stat. 56, 153
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012)) (emphasis added).
179
Reardon, supra note 177.

2018]

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 2.0

492

regulate the Internet.”180 Though the Order seems to rely more
on Title II of the 1934 Act, Section 706 could provide
additional cover for future FCC control of the Internet, and it
might even prove more resilient in withstanding a court
challenge.
In a sense, Title II reclassification relies on a public
utility theory based on the duties of ISPs,181 while the 706
approach focuses on a public interest theory emphasizing the
FCC’s responsibilities as a steward of the public good. While the
Internet’s infrastructure is largely the product of private
investment, one can regard the “ether” of the World Wide Web
as a public good, perhaps even as public property justifying FCC
regulation, albeit without it being a scarce resource in the same
way the electromagnetic spectrum is.
That this public good or public property is a public
forum is a short step from a statutory interpretation into a
constitutional argument. Professor Dawn Nunziato laments the
lack of truly public spaces on the Internet, arguing that the
medium has become indispensable for the exercise of
meaningful First Amendment rights.182 She surveys alternative
views of First Amendment protection.183 The more widely
recognized, and perhaps more generally accepted, view is that
the First Amendment is a check against government
encroachment on speech—that it enshrines a negative liberty.184
Another take regards the First Amendment as a positive right,
as a facilitator of free speech.185 This view is reflected in the
Supreme Court’s public forum doctrine, which holds the state
responsible for setting aside public spaces where First
Amendment rights can be exercised free of censorship.186
Nunizato argues that courts and policymakers must ensure that
adequate public forums exist on the Internet.187 Professor Noah
Zatz concurs, calling for government to play an active role not
only in providing public forums, but in ensuring that the everexpanding Web is organized in a way that achieves diversity of
opinion.188 Such a right to speak online is arguably closely
180
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related to a right of association, a Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process protection most famously enunciated by the Supreme
Court in NAACP v. Alabama.189 Along this line of reasoning,
individuals have a right to connect with one another online, in
chat rooms, on social media, or on domain-name registered
sites.
Indeed, these are exactly the arguments that Prager
University makes in its lawsuit against YouTube.190 Prager
University is “a nonprofit that produces short educational
videos from conservative perspectives,” usually featuring
computer animations and a professor or expert who seeks to
counter a popular liberal or media narrative.191 More than three
dozen Prager University videos have been placed in restricted
mode within the last year, depriving the nonprofit of advertising
revenue and of much of its targeted audience, university
students.192 In its complaint, Prager University makes a First
Amendment claim, alleging that YouTube violated both its
right to speak and its right to assemble within the public forum
of the Internet.193 It goes on to state that, because YouTube held
itself out as a public forum on the Internet, it became a state
actor in regulating speech on its site and engaged in viewpoint
discrimination by censoring Prager University videos.194 Such
lawsuits are likely to be increasingly common so long as
platforms censor or ban particular users based on their politics.
One need not subscribe to the public good or public
forum view of the Internet to recognize that the public
utility/common carrier rationale of the Title II approach
suggests that ISPs are merely conduits of broadband service,
not independent entities with the right to decide what content
reaches their users. This directly conflicts with the view that
ISPs are First Amendment speakers with the right to make
editorial decisions about the content they transmit. Such an
interpretation could invite the FCC (and perhaps the FEC) to
ensure that ISPs engaging in content curation—and perhaps
platforms and other edge providers—do not discriminate
against certain speakers, setting up a fight over free speech.
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Former Chairman Wheeler stated in 2014 that while the
Commission is not going to take over the Internet, it would not
“abandon its responsibility to oversee that broadband networks
operate in the public interest” and that it was “committed to
maintaining our networks as conduits” “for channels of all of
the forms of speech protected by the First Amendment.”195
Though the implications of this pledge can be debated, the
reference to the First Amendment portends a powder-keg of a
controversy that may erupt in future net neutrality skirmishes,
particularly if future commissioners have more ambitious
regulatory goals.
Since the early days of dial-up service, prominent voices
have called for government regulation of speech on the
Internet. For example, Cass Sunstein challenged the very
precept of the Web as a “marketplace of ideas,” arguing that
democracy will be disserved by a free Internet, because users
will seek only websites that reinforce their existing
viewpoints.196 His solutions include taxpayer subsidized speech
and rules that require websites to carry viewpoints opposed to
the statements expressed on those sites.197
Sunstein’s proposal raises the following question: What
exactly would be regulated, and by whom? His policy
prescriptions, along with those of other proponents of increased
Internet content regulation like Professor Andrew Chin, have
been directed at websites.198 Former FEC Commissioner
Ravel’s proposed rules would apply to individual campaign
websites and creations like videos.199 The Fairness Doctrine
applied to radio and TV stations and their broadcasts, which
principally entailed news and public access programming.200
But would an Internet Fairness Doctrine apply to all edge
providers, every website, to news-focused websites, or only
those of broadcast license holders that publish their TV or radio
content online? Initially, the First Amendment-based net
neutrality debates focused almost exclusively on ISPs, large
companies that provide access to the content of individual
websites. These companies include AT&T, Comcast, Cox,
Verizon, and Spectrum. The Open Internet Order specifically
195
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referred to Broadband Internet Access Service (BIAS).201 Aside
from access to simple websites, ISPs provide access to contentproviding companies like Amazon and Netflix that create
and/or distribute videos and programs.202 Many ISPs are also
content providers. For instance, Comcast owns NBCUniversal
and delivers TV shows, news, and movies through its Xfinity
Internet service.203
Today, however, it is large platforms, not ISPs, that are
drawing ire from tech observers and regulators, and not just
because of their anticompetitive behavior. During a one-month
span in 2017, Google (along with Apple) banned the social
media app Gab from its Android app store, because it did not
censor its users’ speech204 and was alleged to be a haven for the
alt-right.205 It demonetized several videos it considered too
controversial, and it threatened to ban publishers from using its
advertising services for violating Google’s ban on hate
speech.206 As Professor Adam Candeub noted, “Android and
Apple’s mobile app stores often practice political censorship, as
have domain name and website hosting services. Kicking a
website off its domain name or excluding an app from all
[i]Phones restricts content creators far more than any ISP
could.”207 Chairman Pai, who agrees with this assessment of the
power/influence differential, recently wrote that there are
questions worth raising about Silicon Valley companies’ lack of
transparency in the way they manage content.208
A challenge to any future FCC rule establishing some
form of an Internet Fairness Doctrine would invite the Supreme
Court to establish whether content regulations on the Internet
are constitutional, and in answering this question, might
201
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establish whether ISPs are speakers for First Amendment
purposes. The latter would have implications for net neutrality,
as this was a key argument made by Verizon in its 2014 case.
But the Court might also be faced with the constitutional status
of platforms and individual websites, as well as for web-based
entities somewhere in between, such as open-source software,
search engines, browsers like Mozilla’s Firefox, and digitalmedia services like Apple’s iTunes. This raises three questions:
(1) Would a Fairness Doctrine or some form of FCC content
regulation be desirable?; (2) Would it be feasible?; and (3)
Would it be constitutional?
B. The FCC Should Refrain from Regulating Political Speech on the
Net
The first question is a normative one: Should the FCC
exert greater influence over the Internet’s political content? For
the same reasons listed in the 1985 report on the Fairness
Doctrine, the answer is no.209 Most importantly, not only was
the Fairness Doctrine unsuccessful in promoting a variety of
opinion, but it actually had the opposite effect of hindering
diverse viewpoints.210 The Commission found that by 1985, the
“multiplicity of voices in the marketplace” did a better job of
giving audiences a wide range of issue perspectives than the
Doctrine ever did.211 Today, cable and the Internet have
multiplied this ‘multiplicity of viewpoints’ many-fold beyond
what the 1985 Commission could have envisioned. Secondly,
the Commission decided that the Doctrine intruded too far into
the journalistic freedom of broadcasters.212
Finally, the potential for abuse by the Fairness Doctrine
is hard to ignore. Former Commissioner McDowell cites the
scholarship of former CBS News president and former
Columbia University professor Fred Friendly in arguing that
both Democratic and Republican presidential administrations
have viewed the Fairness Doctrine as a potential political
weapon.213 Gearing up for his reelection against Senator Barry
Goldwater, and chagrined by talk radio opposition to his
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, President Kennedy directed aides to
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leverage the FCC against stations critical of his policy.214 This
involved an Administration operative listening to broadcasts in
the basement of his Bethesda home, tape recording
programming, and demanding transcripts from the stations.215
Later, the Democratic National Committee provided kits for
left-leaning advocacy groups to “harass” radio stations with
threats of Fairness Doctrine litigation into providing airtime to
respond.216 Such an artifice would not be lost on the Nixon
Administration.217 Officials who were later implicated in the
Watergate cover-up referred to the Red Lion-bulwarked Fairness
Doctrine as a way to “eliminate once and for all” programs
critical of the Administration.218 Imagine future presidents
resorting to a reprised Fairness Doctrine to undermine the
opposition party by discouraging ISPs or websites from
discussing political issues lest they be sued or fined.
C. Several Approaches to Regulating Political Speech Online Have
Been Proposed, But Each is Problematic, Making Such Regulation
a Bad Idea
If some form of a Fairness Doctrine were to be
implemented online, at least two questions would need to be
answered. First, to what would the policy apply: ISPs and edge
providers alike? Second, what requirements or restrictions
would it entail, a simple ban on censoring content or an
affirmative duty to offer opposing viewpoints?
To avoid confusion in terminology, it must be
acknowledged that net neutrality discussions frequently focus
on the dichotomy of what is often called “content neutrality”
and “packet neutrality.”219 Used in this sense, “content
neutrality” has a viewpoint neutral connotation and instead
means requiring ISPs to treat categories of data the same
(videos, emails, audio clips, etc.) without discriminating within
those categories based on the opinions or substance expressed,
while packet neutrality means treating all categories of data the
same.220 This section discusses “content” in terms of the
substance of what is conveyed rather than referring to file types
or categories of data.
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The dichotomy between ISPs that provide connection to
the Internet and edge providers that supply the content of the
Net is not entirely clear-cut. Line drawing is difficult, as almost
all ISPs provide sponsored content on start-up pages or through
software or web-based tools, thereby engaging in some form of
content curation. “Edge providers” run the gamut from
powerful social media platforms like Facebook to simple
webpages. Policymakers would first need to decide what to
regulate.
One rationale for regulating ISPs is the noncompetitive
nature of the telecommunications industry in most markets.221
Seventy-five percent of the public has only one choice of
broadband provider.222 In contrast, a user blocked by Google
can theoretically select a rival service. But is there really
another search engine on par? There certainly is no comparable
alternative to Facebook and Twitter, and an app booted from
both the Apple and Google Play stores is effectively doomed.
This suggests regulators might focus on entities with
disproportionate control, influence, or market share. This might
be something akin to an antitrust approach to policymaking
and enforcement; albeit one focused on issues of speech and
expression and less on economics and innovation. One must be
mindful of the distinction between regulating based on First
Amendment values and regulating based on antitrust concerns,
as there are different considerations involved.223 The latter is a
topic unto itself and not the subject of this Article. Here also,
whether from an antitrust or free speech focus, line drawing is a
fraught issue.
If Congress and/or the FCC were to heed calls for
platform regulation, it is possible policymakers could adopt the
definition “interactive computer service” from Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act224 as its standard. This
would give it broad authority to regulate ISPs, platforms, and
perhaps smaller entities. This standard would help define the
principal actors by capturing the major online entities and
essentially reverse Section 230 in a principal way: it would
remove platforms’ immunity and subject them to liability for
their curation choices. Enforcement discretion could fill in
gaps.
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The FCC (and perhaps even the FEC in regard to
campaigns and elections) would then need to flesh out a new
Fairness Doctrine. The more modest and incremental approach
would be to prohibit major platforms from censoring speech,
essentially imposing common carrier duties on them. As
Professor Candeub notes,225 the Supreme Court has defined a
“common carrier” as a “company that makes a public offering
to provide communications facilities whereby all members of
the public who choose to employ such facilities may
communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing.”226 The FCC could rely on Title II net neutrality
principles as legal justification to extend common carrier
principles from ISPs to edge providers.227 Social media
companies often hold themselves out as de facto common
carriers by describing themselves in terms similar to the Court’s
definition.228 Candeub points229 to Twitter’s mission statement,
which is to “[g]ive everyone the power to create and share ideas
and information instantly, without barriers.”230 Aggrieved
parties who are suspended or banned could then call Twitter’s
bluff.
The more sweeping alternative would be to establish an
affirmative duty to carry content that expresses opposing views.
This would be more in the spirit of the Fairness Doctrine that
governed television and radio. Aside from an obligation to
carry all content transmitted by users, certain entities, like
platforms or chief news sources, would have a duty to actively
curate content from varying perspectives. Not only could they
not refuse to carry certain speech, but they would also be
required to promote content that might not otherwise have
reached their platforms or websites. However, a Fairness
Doctrine of this persuasion would arguably have less legal
support or precedent than a Title II-inspired common carrier
regime that merely restricted censorship. Establishing a
balanced content requirement would also pose greater problems
of administration.
If ISPs or edge providers were subject to a Fairness
Doctrine that required them to provide “balanced content,”
they would face a technically daunting task due to the
decoupling between transmission and content.231 Unlike
225

See Candeub, supra note 207.
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979).
227
See Candeub, supra note 207.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
Company Mission & Values Page, TWITTER,
https://about.twitter.com/en_us/company.html (last visited May 3, 2018).
231
See Leonhardt, supra note 219, at 9.
226

2018]

FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 2.0

500

broadcast stations which control both the transmission and
content of what they produce, ISPs mostly transmit others’
content, and by connecting users to the Internet, grant them
access to other ISPs over which they have no control.232 This
would seem to provide a rationale for a Fairness Doctrine that
applied only to individual websites. Individual websites, like
broadcast stations, create their own content, and would thus
seemingly bear greater responsibility for providing balanced
political discussion. Somewhere in the middle lie many larger
platforms, like Facebook. These platforms provide their own
content, but they also rely on algorithms to generate
personalized content based on the browsing behavior of their
end-users. The values of public forum doctrine for speakers on
the Net could conflict with the right of users to remain in their
own echo chambers. Thus, the question of what to regulate
again evades an easy answer.
Several models have been floated, many dating back to
the years when America Online reigned. Academic Andrew
Chin has proposed must-carry regulations for the most popular
websites, determined by the number of hits over a given period,
perhaps weekly.233 The most popular sites would be required to
reserve space for websites participating in a voluntary public
exchange.234 This exchange would consist of websites that agree
to post links to one another’s sites based on an automated,
rotating basis.235 Chin argues this would be a content-neutral
regulation that could survive the tier of intermediate scrutiny
applied by the Supreme Court to the medium of cable TV in
Turner,236 in which the Court upheld must-carry rules on cable
companies.237 Of course, Chin’s system favors some content by
default, as it is likely that only less-popular sites would
participate in the exchange to increase visits to their pages.
Such must-carry regulations would disproportionately direct
Web traffic to these less popular Web pages than they would
receive in the absence of being featured on the exchange. One
question is how the FCC or other regulatory body would
successfully monitor such traffic. Sunstein has also argued for
must-carry provisions in addition to public funding for the
posting of contrary viewpoints.238 Professor Noah Zatz
envisions a system in which any party that wants to offer an
232
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opposing view to an existing webpage can petition a
government agency like the FCC or an authorized third party to
encode a pop-up window or additional browser tab into the
Web page’s code.239 The argument is that this would not impact
the First Amendment rights of the Web page owner or
operator, because it would not change the page at all, but
merely trigger an additional tab to appear in the site visitor’s
browser.240 This would address the concerns of those like
Nunziato who argue that online public forums often must be
“interstitial” to be meaningful.241
Of course, the administrative feasibility of an agency
responding to an incalculable number of requests for individual
Web page encoding, for an ever-expanding Internet, seems
doubtful. Even if a third party contracted for this work in a
public-private partnership, the FCC or some agency would still
need to conduct effective oversight. Zatz’s proposal seems
dated given how much the Internet has developed in the last
two decades.
More modern proposals include those of Public
Knowledge Vice President Harold Feld to develop different
rules for different entities.242 Building on a concept of a “right to
reach an audience” through major search engines, Professor
Jennifer Chandler has proposed mandates that search engines
publicly disclose how they index and rank search results.243 She
contends that search engines should be required to publicly list
any websites they exclude from searches, along with
advertisements or results that the search engines receive
payment for.244 Like then-Senator Franken, D-Minn.,245
Professor Pasquale has called for a more expansive definition of
net neutrality, pushing “neutrality beyond the ‘pipes’ of the
internet, to hardware, critical software, dominant search
engines, social networks, and apps.”246 This reflects a prevalent
239
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European perspective delineated by the French advisory
commission Conseil National du Numérique in its national
report on platform neutrality.247 Identifying Apple, Amazon,
Expedia, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Netflix, Twitter, and
Yahoo! as examples, the commission calls for disclosure
requirements on the companies’ content-management systems,
such as the workings of their algorithms.248 It urges
development of “interventions and penalties,”249 establishment
of “neutrality rating agencies,”250 and legal remedies for
aggrieved users.251 In perhaps its most activist language, the
commission echoes Chandler’s invocation of a “right to reach
an audience”252 by arguing for neutrality that both protects the
liberty to speak, and advances an “offensive angle aimed at
developing user power in the long term, promoting economic
and social progress.”253 If the commission means empowering
users by ensuring their voices would be heard in a balanced
public forum, this sounds a lot like a Fairness Doctrine for the
Twenty-first Century. It is also possible that either the FEC or
FCC could resort to a variation of the filtering software already
being applied to 95 percent of citizens’ content in the United
Kingdom, a development that amounts to prior restraint.254
Rather than censoring content outright, the software could be
used to flag content for fairness concerns.
The common thread among these proposals is the dual
problem of line-drawing and administrability. As former
Commissioner McDowell points out, the FCC simply does not
have enough staff to scrutinize the countless editorial choices
made by ISPs, platforms, and websites every day.255 Even if it
did, it would be forced to analyze public affairs issues of
varying novelty and complexity to determine the contrasting
viewpoints on any given issue (often more than a binary choice
between opposing sides).256 It would need to decide who should
present those opposing views, as well as when and how they
should be presented.257 Although technically complying with
the requirement of providing balanced perspectives, “interactive
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computer services” if we borrowed the Section 230 definition,258
could present extreme positions that distort viewpoints, make
opposing perspectives seem ridiculous, or create “straw man”
arguments.259
Perhaps the most promising is Hal Singer’s answer to
the problem inherent in applying antitrust remedies to free
speech challenges.260 Singer argues that antitrust agencies may
overlook Internet developments, like effects on speech or
content, that are not reflected in price or other market
variables.261 He also argues that the consumer-welfare standard
that plaintiffs must satisfy in antitrust cases to recover is too
high to make lawsuits practical, because it is difficult to prove
the concrete harm required for standing.262 Finally, he contends
that the slow pace of lawsuits is ill-suited to the rapidly evolving
ecosystem of the Internet.263
Singer proposes a tribunal loosely modeled after the one
used to adjudicate discrimination complaints under the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992.264 However, unlike the tribunal under the Cable Act,
which was overseen by the FCC, Singer’s body would function
like an Article I court, independent of the agency’s influence.265
While it would serve an antitrust function, “there is no reason
why the tribunal could not accommodate complaints against
dominant Internet intermediaries, such as Google and
Facebook.”266 This would be a complaint-based system of
regulation, which would depend on private-party-initiated
litigation to bring the conduct of online entities to regulators’
attention.
However, the potential for incessant litigation,
unfairness in levying penalties among Internet entities, and the
prospect of constitutional infringement all caution against the
FCC enforcing such a doctrine.
A more modest proposal would be for the government
to provide its own versions of search engines, platforms, and
directories in line with public access stations on local radio and
258
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TV, and in the same spirit of such long-held, widespread
agreement as that of supporting public libraries for books and
postal subsidies for newspapers.267 Government subsidizes
public broadcast stations PBS (TV) and NPR (radio), so
perhaps it could do likewise for an Internet platform. Of course,
that could result, at least to some degree, in government
making its own decisions about which speech to carry. It is also
doubtful that government would create platforms that are
comparable to entities like Google and Facebook in popularity
or influence. There is a reason why the “invisible hand” of a
market-oriented Internet has thrived without heavy-handed
regulation for more than two decades: no government agency
could possibly regulate speech efficiently or fairly across so vast
a dimension. While there might be some merit in these
proposals, regulators should proceed cautiously given the
potential for unintended consequences and the government’s
difficulty in keeping abreast of the rapidly developing Internet.
D. Courts Would Likely Strike Down Any Attempt by the FCC to
Regulate Political Speech on the Internet as an Unconstitutional
Infringement of First Amendment Protection
Irrespective of the wisdom in a Fairness Doctrine for the
Internet, the FCC’s authority would likely be challenged as to
whether it is properly derived from Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934 and/or Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. If the answer to this
administrative law inquiry was yes, then a revived Fairness
Doctrine would likely invite the Supreme Court to decide
whether FCC regulation of Internet content violates the First
Amendment. In doing so, its ruling would potentially have
consequences for any FEC attempt to regulate online campaign
speech beyond what it does now. Both proponents and
opponents of government regulation of political speech can
draw encouragement from the absence of any single, allencompassing guideline as to the emerging medium of the
Internet. Both sides can make plausible arguments from
scattered case law.
Generally, content-based laws are presumptively
unconstitutional and can only be upheld if the government
proves they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests.268 In reviewing content-based laws, courts are to apply
the highest level or “tier” of judicial review: strict scrutiny.269
267
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Strict scrutiny is distinguished from less-searching forms of
judicial review, like rational basis review and intermediate
scrutiny, by two requirements that a law must meet: (1) it must
be necessary to serve a “compelling” state interest and (2) it
must be “narrowly drawn” to achieve that interest.270 Still, the
court has not treated all communications media the same,
affording some more protections than others. As Justice
Jackson observed, “The moving picture screen, the radio, the
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner
orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each,
in my view, is a law unto itself.”271 Thus, it is difficult to say
conclusively what the Court may decide for the Internet.
As discussed above, the Court has upheld FCC
regulation of broadcast content based on the scarcity272 and
captive audience273 rationales: There are only so many TV and
radio stations, and people are forced to watch or listen to
whatever comes across those channels. While suggesting
broadcast stations were speakers for First Amendment
purposes, the Court essentially held that their First Amendment
rights could be curtailed in the public interest, e.g. for the sake
of the broadcast medium. But the Court has not stopped at
allowing government regulation of broadcast stations for the
sake of the broadcast medium. It has done so for the sake of the
stations themselves. While conceding that cable programmers
and cable operators are likewise speakers entitled to First
Amendment protection,274 the Court has upheld FCC mustcarry provisions that require cable companies to include
broadcast TV channels in their packages to keep broadcast
stations from going out of business.275 Despite emergent
technologies like cable, the Court held that broadcast was still
“demonstrably a principal source of information and
entertainment for a great part of the Nation's population.”276 It
found that an important government interest justified mustcarry rules, namely “promoting the widespread dissemination
of information from a multiplicity of sources.”277 With
broadcast media being transferred to the Internet, would a
similar rationale extend FCC regulation to license holders of
the wireless broadband spectrum, emboldening the agency to
impose must-carry rules or a Fairness Doctrine of some form?
270
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When the must-carry cable TV issue was first before the Court,
it distinguished the medium from content-based rules on
newspapers addressed in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
holding that cable providers play a “bottleneck,” “gatekeeper”
function in terms of providing subscribers access in the home.278
Given that cable providers have control over such a “critical
pathway of communication” and can silence the speech of
others with a “mere flick of the switch,” government was
justified in treating them differently.279 Thus, regulation of cable
triggered only intermediate scrutiny.280 If the issue were before
the Court today, would the contemporary ISP that provides
cable/Internet access to consumers fare likewise? What about
dominant platforms?
Professor Noah Zatz argues that they should.281 Zatz
urges application of public forum doctrine, calling for
government to address the issue of Internet access bottlenecks
by designating areas of the Internet as public forums and
actively structuring the Web in a way that achieves viewpoint
diversity.282 There are no doubt parallels among cable television
providers, ISPs, and large platforms. Lawsuits, like the one filed
by Prager University, advocate for a more scopious
interpretation of public forum doctrine that encompasses online
platforms.283 The scholarship of Zatz284 and Nunziato285 has
become the substance of litigation.286
There is reason to suspect that the Court’s view on the
issue is evolving. Jeremy Carl287 and Professor Mark
Grabowski288 point to Packingham v. North Carolina.289 There, the
Court unanimously decided that a North Carolina law barring
registered sex offenders from accessing social media violated
278
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the First Amendment. Recognizing this was the first case taken
by the Court “to address the relationship between the First
Amendment and the modern Internet,”290 Justice Kennedy
wrote that social media “websites can provide perhaps the most
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his
or her voice heard.”291 While it may be tempting to read the
holding striking down a flawed statute too broadly, the case is
certainly fodder for champions of a robust public forum
doctrine. Grabowski also notes an implication292 when the case
is read alongside the Court’s holding in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins.293 The decision in the latter case affirmed that
state constitutions could go further than the Bill of Rights in
protecting a right to speak, so long as they do not violate other
provisions of the U.S Constitution.294 It upheld a California
Supreme Court decision that extended public forum doctrine to
a private shopping mall.295 Rejecting a First Amendment claim
that the shopping mall’s owner was being forced to carry the
speech of students who were trying to get petition signatures on
the premises, the Court distinguished the mall owner from the
newspaper editor in Tornillo, holding that while an editor would
be liable under the statute in that case for the content of what
was published in his newspaper, the owner would not be
identified with, nor responsible for, the expressive activities of
the mall-going students.296 As Grabowski recognizes, today’s
students would post a petition on social media,297 now arguably
more critical as a public forum than a shopping mall was to the
California Supreme Court,298 and the Golden State, where
most—if not all—Silicon Valley companies reside, might
require these private companies to make their forums public.299
As California goes so goes the nation? Its legislature, like those
of other states, is considering bills to make net neutrality state
policy.300 Whatever happens in court with the FCC over the
issue of preemption, it could move for other types of neutrality.
Advocates for a right to speak in the Internet’s dominant public
forums voice the First Amendment theory that freedom of
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speech executes a truth-seeking function by fostering a
“marketplace of ideas.”301
On the other hand, in Reno v. ACLU,302 the Court
affirmed singular protection for the Internet as a medium “of
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds” in
striking down an anti-indecency law, despite the much lesser
protection afforded to obscenity than other categories of
speech.303 The Court held that the captive audience rationale
behind regulating broadcast stations was inapplicable because
Internet users must take affirmative steps to access content and
seldom arrive at a given web page by accident.304 This suggests
that a core rationale for broadcast regulation could not be
invoked in favor of an Internet Fairness Doctrine.
Print media, such as newspapers and magazines, enjoy
the strongest First Amendment protection, as the Court struck
down a must-carry-analogous statute that required newspapers
to provide political candidates free space to respond to editorial
criticism in Tornillo.305
Because the Fairness Doctrine has hitherto applied only
to television and radio stations, the Court would need to
determine whether ISPs, platforms, websites, and perhaps
everything in between, are more like radio and television
stations, as in Red Lion, or more like newspapers or magazines,
as in Tornillo. While the Court relied on the rationale of
spectrum scarcity in the former case and not in the latter,
suggesting that while there are only so many radio frequencies,
there is enough tree pulp for anyone to publish a newspaper or
pamphlet, an alternative argument is that there are far more
broadcast stations in certain areas of the country than there are
viable newspapers.306 The year Tornillo was decided, the
newspaper at issue, the Miami Herald, had a circulation of
396,797 and was the regional print hegemon.307 The six radio
stations and three television stations in the same area had much
more to fear from competition than the Herald, a virtual
monopoly in the region.308 Practically speaking, the effect on
the public is the same.309 In a time of media consolidation that
threatens to reduce the number of major ISPs, could a similar
rationale be extended to regulate how Spectrum and AT&T—
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who often have monopolies in particular markets—provide
Internet content to consumers?
That the modern Internet aggregates content from
radio, broadcast television, cable television, and print media
onto a single platform only underscores the uncertainty around
this question.310 The traditional view of the First Amendment is
that it is a restriction on government interference with speech
and does not apply to the decisions of private actors as to
whether to create speech or carry the speech of others.311 The
use of “the,” a definite article before “freedom of speech” in the
First Amendment,312 lends support to the view that the freedom
had a specific meaning and scope that predated the
Constitution.313 Constitutional experts note314 Justice Scalia’s
take that, the “core abuse” the First Amendment guarded
against was “the scheme of licensing laws implemented by the
monarch and Parliament to contain the evils of the printing
press in 16th- and 17th-century England.”315 Under Professor
Tribe’s views, ISPs are like newspapers with a right to exclude
speech:
The Constitution applies equally even outside
traditional print or electronic media, so that, for
example, the government cannot require an
individual to open his doors and turn his home
into a forum for protesters. Further, like a
newspaper, a BSP [ISP] has a limited capacity to
distribute information and accordingly enjoys the
right to decide how to apportion that space. And
as noted, BSPs make decisions about the delivery
of particular content as they continue to innovate
in the products, services, and business models
they employ. 316
For constitutional purposes, is there a distinction
between ISPs that provide access to the Internet, like Comcast
and Verizon; platforms, like Google and Apple that provide
services once connected to the Net; and individual websites like
310
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CNN and Drudge Report that provide content? Would an
Internet Fairness Doctrine apply to all three categories? ISPs,
search engines, and news sites all provide links to other
webpages. And in choosing which links to include on their
interface, they make expressive choices about which speech to
convey. In one sense, they are no different than more
traditional ‘speakers’ like newspapers, books, and pamphlets in
quoting, citing, or referring to other speakers.317 On the other
hand, they provide a direct, immediate connection to these
other speakers through publicly available hyperlinks, essentially
providing a public forum consistent with the Zatz school of
thought that subjects them to some modicum of government
regulation.318 An Internet Fairness Doctrine becomes more
tenable under Title II when the Web is viewed as a public good
or public forum. However, these web-based entities make
editorial decisions about which speech to transmit, making
them more like broadcast stations and newspapers, and less like
mere common carriers or conduits for the speech of others.
It is for just this reason that the Court would likely strike
down content-based regulations as unconstitutional. Recall that
in Red Lion, the Court based its decision on spectrum scarcity
while reserving the option of reevaluating the Fairness Doctrine
if conditions changed or it proved counterproductive in
promoting viewpoint diversity.319 Today, the Red Lion Court
would barely recognize the media landscape and could hardly
fault it for failing to provide a robust exchange of conflicting
opinion. That proponents of a reprised Fairness Doctrine or
government regulation of online content mean well is of no
import. “Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger” that
laws created for a benign purpose may one day be used to
censor.320
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether the Fairness Doctrine is restored in familiar
form or incorporated into new Internet policy, the debate over
government’s role in regulating online political speech will
likely continue. Though the specter of net neutrality that roiled
fears of a more interventionist FCC has been rolled back, the
Open Internet Order was neither necessary nor sufficient for a
new regulatory regime. As the goings-on of the FEC have
illustrated, proponents of a more activist government in shaping
317
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Internet content have multiple ends, and multiple means for
achieving such policy goals. If anything, frustration over the
state of campaign finance law, both online and offline; political
censorship on platforms; fake news, extremism and even crime
like sex trafficking, have galvanized academics, policymakers,
and politicians toward exploring different approaches to the
prevailing hands-off policy that is the legacy of the modern
Internet.
But the Fairness Doctrine provides a cautionary tale of
unintended consequences. It rested on a shaky constitutional
promontory that has since been swept away by a new tide of
technology. Though noble in purpose, its aims and means are
ill suited to today’s Internet, and policymakers should take
note. For the foregoing reasons, greater regulation of Internet
political content will chill free speech, prove impractical to
implement as a policy matter, and ultimately, is likely to be
ruled unconstitutional.

